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This paper explores the extent to which global and diffuse risks impact 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood 
and identifies tipping points at which risks can turn into immediate 
threats for the EaP countries, with implications for the EU. We apply five 
major risk categories to the EaP area that cover the majority of global and 
diffuse risks and suggest their prioritization based on temporality, 
probability of occurrence, and potential multiplication effects. We 
identify 28 tipping points which may exacerbate the impact of global and 
diffuse risks in EaP countries and result in governance breakdowns or 
new violent conflicts. The evidence suggests three global risks ‒ 
geopolitical rivalry, unconventional security risks and global economic 
and financial risk ‒ as most probable and with the most destabilizing 
impact on the EaP area in the short term. Disease outbreaks can be equally 
destructive, but with less certain probability. In terms of actorness, a 
majority of global risks seem to be linked to Russia and its assertive 
agenda, whereas others are diffuse in nature and hard to locate. Finally, in 
terms of resilience and mitigation of risks, societies in the EaP area seem 
to possess a basic degree of governance capacity which needs to be further 
strengthened by the EU to better cope with global and diffuse risks. 
1. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL AND DIFFUSE RISKS IN THE EU’S 
EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD 
This working paper analyses the impact of global and diffuse risks on the EU’s 
Eastern neighbourhood region: the countries of the Eastern Partnership Area (EaP).1 
It seeks to answer two research questions: (1) To what extent do global and diffuse 
risks impact the EaP? (2) What are the tipping points at which risks may turn into 
immediate threats for EaP countries, with implications for the EU? 
Global and diffuse risks have a twofold impact on the EU’s security and internal 
stability: direct and proximate. Direct impacts emerge as a result of a direct 
interaction of global risks with the EU’s security. Proximate impacts travel through 
the EU’s neighbourhood regions: global and diffuse risks negatively impact EU 
neighbourhood countries with possible negative spill-over effects for the EU’s 
security. By analysing impacts of global and diffuse risks on the EaP area, this 
working paper contributes to the discussion and understanding of proximate risks 
that threaten the EU’s security via the EaP.  
                                               
1
  The EaP initiative covers six former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. 
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Drawing on the conceptual framework developed by Börzel and Risse (2018) for how 
risks increase the likelihood of violent conflict and governance breakdown, we start 
with the empirical observation that most EaP countries experience some form of 
areas of limited statehood (ALS) and/or contested orders (CO). Börzel and Risse 
define ALS as parts of a country in which the central authorities “lack the ability to 
implement and enforce central rules and decisions and/or in which they do not 
control the means of violence” (2018: 9), while CO are “incompatibilities between two 
or more competing views about how political, economic, social and territorial order 
should be established and/or sustained” (2018: 12). Although both ALS and CO pose 
vulnerabilities and can have negative spill-over effects for the EU, they do not 
constitute a security threat to the EU per se, and only start to threaten EU security 
and stability if, under certain conditions, they deteriorate into violent conflict and 
governance breakdown (Börzel and Risse 2018; see also Magen et al. 2019a). Hence 
this paper seeks to identify tipping points at which global and diffuse risks may 
trigger governance breakdown and violent conflict in areas marked by ALS and CO.  
For our definition and conceptualization of global and diffuse risks, we draw on 
Magen et al. (2019a: 8), who argue that global risks “have a tangible geographical 
nexus in the sense that they originate or emanate from particular actors and 
territories outside the EU or its proximate neighbourhood, including challenges to 
global order by revisionist actors such as Russia, China, Iran, and radical Islamist 
movements”, while diffuse risks are “risks – such as global financial crises, cyber-
coercion, pandemics, or risks emanating from global warming – that are either not 
geographically contingent or are non-territorial in nature, though their particular 
effects on different localities are likely to vary”. Following Magen et al.’s 
conceptualization of global and diffuse risks (2019a: 18), we analyse five major risk 
clusters: 
 geopolitical rivalry and risks of major armed conflict; 
 unconventional security risks, including hybrid-warfare, cyber-warfare 
technology-driven disruption,2 and weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
 biological and environmental risks, including uncontrolled urbanization and 
disease outbreaks); 
 demography and uncontrolled migration;  
 global financial and other systemic economic risks. 
                                               
2
  Although this was a separate sixth category of risk in Magen et al.’s original conceptualization, 
we have subsumed it under unconventional security risks as, in the EaP countries, certain 
aspects of such disruption (such as work force automation) do not yet play a significant role.  
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To explore the probable impacts of global and diffuse risks, we seek to identify 
“tipping points” that may exacerbate their influence and result in governance 
breakdowns or violent conflicts in the EaP areas already affected by CO and/or ALS. 
Magen et al. propose a three-tiered classification of tipping points: (1) one-time 
catastrophic events, (2) cascading factors, and (3) layered factors (2019b: 10). Unlike 
one-time catastrophic events, both cascading and layered tipping points “result from 
the cumulative effects of various events” (2019b: 17), hence taking the form of 
gradual processes. Cascading factors consist “of an inter-connected, sequential chain 
of events that together amount to a tipping point”, while layered factors are rather 
unrelated and evolve independently from each other (Magen et al. 2019b: 17). Here, 
we include and analyse all three types of tipping points, categorizing them in two 
groups: one-time events that may erupt suddenly (military invasion, catastrophic 
event or pandemics) and gradual processes that may evolve slowly and involve both 
interconnected and autonomous processes (cascading and layered factors). In doing 
so, we extend the definition of tipping points as one-time or short-term events that 
could spark acute instability (Magen et al. 2019b: 9) to include medium and long-
term processes (both interconnected and autonomous) which often go unnoticed but 
may also result in conflict or governance breakdown.  
Another differentiation we make regarding global and diffuse risks and their 
tipping points refers to the likelihood of their impact, which may be actual, highly 
probable, or potential. Tipping points which are already occurring or are highly 
likely due to aggravated circumstances we refer to as actual impacts. Other impacts 
of global and diffuse risks are however of a more hypothetical nature. Those that 
have already occurred in the recent past and have resulted in severe violence or 
governance breakdown are more likely to be repeated (for instance, Russia’s military 
incursion in Georgia or further aggravation of ongoing military conflict in the 
Eastern Ukraine). Hence their occurrence is suggested by strong historical evidence 
and is generally to be considered as highly probable. Other potential risks are less 
probable, having never yet occurred in the EaP area, but, if we draw conclusions 
from similar events in other parts of the world, could occur at some point in the 
future (for instance, China turning into more assertive actor or a potential cyber-
attack against nuclear facility by state and/or non-state actors). We refer to these 
rather more hypothetical scenarios as potential impacts. 
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Source: (ISPI 2019) 
The EaP is characterized by a proliferation of both ALS and CO which provide the 
fractious conditions for violence and governance breakdowns. In the EaP, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine experience acute forms of ALS in the 
shape of unresolved conflicts (Figure 1). Armenia does not have ALS in its territory 
but is involved in a long conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh which on 
its own constitutes an ALS within Azerbaijan (Waal 2019). Belarus is perhaps the only 
EaP country that does not harbour acute ALS within its territory, however recent 
moves by a resurgent Russia entering the Union State, including an economic 
confederacy with Belarus by 2022, poses some questions regarding the future of the 
country’s sovereignty (Ioffe 2019). In addition, all EaP countries are marked by 
various CO that time and again result in violent clashes, coups, regime changes, or 
peaceful revolutions. Examples of exacerbated CO in the EaP include the total 
governance breakdown in Georgia in the 1990s (Gvalia et al. 2019), the electoral 
revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004 (Kuzio 2009), the Euromaidan 
protests in Kyiv in 2013/2014 (Marples and Mills 2015), the Twitter Revolution in 
Moldova in 2009 (Morozov 2009), and the 2008 post-election public unrest and 2018 
Velvet Revolution in Armenia (Lanskoy and Suthers 2019).  
This high density of ALS and CO is also the reason why the majority of indexes that 
measure governance performance or stability consider the EaP to be volatile and 
unstable. The Fragile State Index, which measures the fragility, risk, and 
vulnerability of 178 states worldwide, categorizes the EaP countries under “warning” 
(Armenia, Belarus, and Moldova) or “elevated warning” (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Ukraine) (Fund for Peace 2019). The volatility of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood is 
Figure 1: Unresolved conflicts (ALS) in the EaP countries 
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further exacerbated by a proliferation of weakly consolidated hybrid regimes which 
are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. The literature identifies those grey-
zone regimes as the most vulnerable to violent conflicts and political instability 
(Goldstone et al. 2010). The majority of the EaP countries fall within the category of 
unconsolidated or hybrid regimes ‒ the Freedom House (FH) Nations in Transit 
Index (NIT) designates Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as “transitional governments 
or hybrid regimes” and Armenia as a “semi-consolidated authoritarian regime”, only 
considering Azerbaijan and Belarus as “consolidated authoritarian regimes” 
(Freedom House 2017). Finally, ALS and CO in the EaP are further exacerbated by the 
low performance of the ruling regimes. With the exception of Georgia, none of the 
EaP countries has achieved even the Eastern European average in terms of effective 
governance (Lebanidze 2017). Overall, a high density of ALS and CO coupled with 
semi-consolidated regimes and ineffective governance creates conditions for 
potential violent conflicts and governance breakdowns in the EaP that may pose 
serious security threats to the EU and its global interest.  
The remainder of this paper will analyse actual, probable, and potential impacts of 
global and diffuse risks on the EaP area. To do so, we look at the interaction of risks 
with ALS and CO in the EaP countries and identify tipping points at which the risks 
could contribute to governance breakdown or/and violent conflict.  
2. GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY AND RISKS OF MAJOR ARMED 
CONFLICT 
In the EU’s neighbourhood as elsewhere, the global order contestation between 
major international actors has taken three major forms: (1) The US transition from a 
regional hegemon to a more reluctant and inward-looking actor; (2) Russia’s 
aggressive attempts to counter Western influence and expand its own sphere of 
influence; and (3) China’s advancement of its alternative global order (Magen et al. 
2019a). All three developments and the interplay between them challenge, to various 
degrees, the EU-promoted liberal international order and increase the probability of 
governance breakdown and violent conflicts in the EaP.  
2.1 United States 
The US has traditionally been one of the main important actors in the EaP area, 
protecting EaP countries from the influences of other actors while promoting 
political stability. Therefore, any fluctuations in the US approach towards the post-
Soviet area may generate significant negative externalities for the countries in the 
region. After the peak of US presence in the EU’s neighbourhoods in the early 2000s, 
the US saw its role shrink, both in the MENA and the EaP regions. Recent trends, 
including the turn to Asia that started under Barack Obama and the more inward-
looking and transactional foreign policy under Donald Trump (Ikenberry 2017) have 
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only strengthened the perception of US strategic withdrawal from the EU’s 
neighbourhood regions. Whereas the EU has claimed the role of providing security 
in a few EaP countries, US abandonment or perceived abandonment may still create 
a power vacuum, invite illiberal actors to fill the gap, or contribute to CO, even to the 
level of violent conflicts. Many authors relate the increasing assertiveness of Russia 
and China to the declining role of the US (Borshchevskaya 2018). Although not 
natural allies in other parts of the world (Song 2014), China and Russia have been 
coordinating their policies in the EU’s neighbourhood to diminish Western 
influence and marginalize both EU and US interests (Mead 2019). On the other hand, 
these two actors rarely challenge each other’s positions in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
For instance, even though China has become increasingly active in the EaP 
countries, Beijing also sees the area as Russia’s zone of influence and does not 
engage in geopolitics in the region (Kaczmarski et al. 2019). For its part, Russia 
tolerates China's interest in the region as long as it remains mostly in the realm of 
investment and trade.  
Facing tough competition from China, the US has started to push its allies and 
partners into a zero-sum game to take sides between the US and China and prevent 
Chinese investments in strategic sectors. The US administration recently warned 
Georgia and Ukraine against increasing Chinese investments and loans that could 
result in irreversible dependency on China (Reuters 2019). Not only the US but also 
European states are concerned that China may use its “debt trap” diplomacy in the 
EaP to acquire strategic assets in debt-for-equity deals and weaken the governance 
capacity of the host states. On its own, however, the transactional foreign policy of 
the current US administration has the potential to add to instability and governance 
problems in the EaP. The inconsistent policies of the Trump administration in the 
EaP countries diminish the attractiveness of the liberal script and increase the risk 
of violent conflicts. For instance, the alleged instrumentalization of military support 
to Ukraine for political purposes (Hirsh 2019) has undermined Western credibility in 
Kyiv but also elsewhere is the EaP. US transactionalism and the drift between the US 
and EU could also further embolden Russia to continue its destabilizing activities in 
Ukraine and Georgia. 
2.2 Russia 
The Russian government under the authoritarian leadership of Vladimir Putin has 
consistently pursued a foreign policy agenda of returning great power status to 
Russia. To advance this agenda, the Kremlin has been attempting to accomplish a 
number of goals in the EaP region: creating and protecting its sphere of influence, 
blocking enlargement of the EU and NATO, integrating EaP populations into Russia-
led regional economic, political, and military organizations, and protecting 
incumbent regimes in neighbouring countries (and, by extension, the Russian 
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regime itself) from a wave of democratization (Ambrosio 2009; Lebanidze 2019a). In 
the last two decades, Russia indeed became the main geopolitical player in the EaP 
region and continues to resort to an extensive tool-box of instruments to secure its 
political, economic, and military dominance. Many of these instruments have a 
direct impact on the establishment and longevity of ALS and CO in the EaP 
countries. The unresolved conflicts of Abkhazia, Crimea, the Donbas Region, 
Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria have been held in a semi-frozen 
condition under the military and political dominance of Russia, whose presence has 
resulted in “territorial” and “social” ALS (Börzel and Risse 2018: 9) in those countries.  
Moreover, although these conflicts are often referred as “frozen” (Blank 2008), 
evidence suggests that they are semi-frozen at best (Frazer 2016) and can easily 
escalate into violent conflicts. Ongoing military actions in the Eastern Ukraine and 
recurring incidents in the Kerch Strait, the continuing “borderization” process in 
Georgia (Kakachia 2018), and recurring sporadic clashes between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia show the fragility of the peacebuilding process in these conflict areas. Their 
continued presence not only carries the threat that CO will turn violent, but also 
undermines the state capacity of the EaP countries, often bringing them to the brink 
of governance breakdown. Georgia in the 1990s and immediately following the 2008 
Russia-Georgia war are two examples of how violent conflicts with Russia’s direct or 
indirect participation can contribute to governance breakdown at the national level 
or in some parts of a country’s sovereign territory. Russia also uses instruments 
other than the unresolved conflicts to achieve its geopolitical objectives, and its 
toolbox includes full-scale military intervention, economic embargoes, 
manipulation of energy prices, and energy cuts (Ambrosio 2009). Considering the 
economic vulnerabilities of the majority of EaP countries and their dependence on 
Russia, the Kremlin’s coercive economic measures place additional pressure on their 
fragile socio-economic structures and further undermine their governance capacity, 
threatening governance breakdown in their institutions.  
Russia’s assertiveness in the EaP can be explained by several factors. First, it seems 
that Russia reacts negatively to the meddling of Western actors in its immediate 
neighbourhood, an area which the Kremlin considers to belong to Russia’s privileged 
interests. Hence, any new initiative may be met with a new provocation by the 
Kremlin. Second, there seems to be a correlation between stable high oil prices and 
Russia’s military adventurism, which has often contributed to the creation and 
persistence of ALS and CO in the EU’s geographic proximities (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: The value of Russia’s oil in constant USD 
 
Source: (Gros 2015) 
From this perspective, Russia would fit the profile of a typical petro state which 
behaves more aggressively during periods of high oil prices when oil extraction 
increases and energy is abundant (Hendrix 2014; Soysa et al. 2010). High oil prices 
alter the incentive structures of key domestic stakeholders and make the country 
less vulnerable to various sanctions as oil “crowds out other export sectors that 
would be interested in open markets” (Gros 2015: 2). More importantly, it increases a 
leader’s political autonomy and risk-acceptance and decreases her political 
accountability to domestic constituencies (Snegovaya 2019). By using BP’s Statistical 
Review of World Energy, Gros (2015) identified a strong correlation between higher 
Soviet/Russian oil production and the Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy actions in 
the EU’s proximity, which may create new ALS and CO or tip existing ones into 
violent conflicts and/or governance breakdowns. Hence, high oil prices may increase 
the likelihood of Russia’s further military adventurism. 
The third factor triggering military adventurism by Russia could be related to the 
Russian regime’s domestic legitimacy and strategies to consolidate its power (Blank 
2009; Chaisty and Whitefield 2015; Shevtsova 2009). Shevtsova (2009: 61) 
characterizes Putin’s regime in Russia as a form of etatism “with regime-
consolidation mechanisms at home that are based on elements of militarism and the 
search for enemies.” Similarly, Filippov (2009: 1826) identifies “diversionary 
tensions designed to distract the domestic audience” as the core element of Russian 
foreign policy towards its neighbours. From this perspective, both the 2008 Russia-
Georgia War (Filippov 2009) and the 2014 annexation of Crimea and conflict in the 
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Eastern Ukraine (Gerstel 2017) can be viewed as “diversionary conflicts”. The ruling 
elite under Vladimir Putin might opt for the strategy of “diversionary tension” 
whenever it feels threatened by major anti-government protests, an attempted coup, 
or any other domestic event. From this perspective, another tipping point may be the 
threat of diffusion of democratic processes in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood, 
with the danger of spill-over into Russia (Umland 2009). 
Finally, failure of EU and US containment strategies may also serve as another 
tipping point at which Russia may move to exploit the vulnerabilities of its 
neighbours to create new ALS or CO or to bring its neighbours to the brink of violent 
conflicts or governance breakdown by exploiting already existing ones. As the 
former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmusen recently admitted, NATO’s 
decision at the 2008 Bucharest Summit not to give Georgia or Ukraine the 
Membership Action Plan to join NATO was “a wrong signal to Putin”; one that 
encouraged Russia to invade Georgia a few months later (IWPR 2018).  
To conclude, it can be argued that, in the EaP, Russia acts as a “multiplier for 
[potential] governance breakdowns and violence” (Börzel and Risse 2018: 15) in 
several ways: (1) by supporting and sustaining ALS in the form of unresolved 
conflicts or through assistance to various religious, ethnic, or military groups (as in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine); (2) by support for unpopular autocratic 
or semi-autocratic incumbents that often results in public outrage and civil unrest 
(e.g., the electoral revolution in Ukraine in 2003; the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine 
in 2013); (3) through economic and trade embargoes and energy wars (as in multiple 
cases in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova), and; (4) by full-scale military interventions 
or territorial annexations (e.g., in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2013).  
2.3 China 
Unlike Russia, China keeps a low profile when it comes to military adventurism in 
the EU’s neighbourhoods. China engages in economic and trade activities, but its 
approach is purely transactional, and it avoids becoming entangled in “sensitive 
geopolitical issues” (Dalay 2019). Chinese actions are therefore not thought to be a 
major trigger of violent conflict or governance breakdown in the EU’s proximity. 
Nevertheless, Chinese engagement and its rivalry with the US and the EU may put 
additional pressure on states with ALS or CO and contribute indirectly to their 
deterioration into governance breakdowns or violent conflicts. So far, however, 
China’s direct negative influence on ALS and CO in the EU’s neighbourhood has been 
rather negligible.  
China considers both regions of the EU’s neighbourhood – the EaP and the MENA – 
as integral parts of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the cornerstone of China’s 
Grand Strategy (OECD 2018). China has established fast-evolving economic and trade 
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relations with a number of EaP countries, especially Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. 
Georgia was the first country in Eurasia to sign a free trade deal with China (Smolnik 
2018), and Belarus became a pioneer country in the BRI and “an important testing 
ground for China’s foreign economic policy” (Kaczmarski et al. 2019: 22). On the 
other hand, China’s relations with Ukraine took a hit after the Euromaidan protests 
and the ensuing Russia-Ukraine conflict. The annexation of Crimea compromised 
Beijing’s plans to acquire and develop a deep-sea port in Sevastopol (Kaczmarski et 
al. 2019). Ukraine’s internal instability, hostile relations with Russia, recently 
established tradition of anti-governmental and pro-democratic protests, and 
perception of Western influence all negatively impact China’s engagement with 
Ukraine (Kaczmarski et al. 2019). Overall, the EaP countries seem to have a low 
priority in China’s foreign policy goals (Kaczmarski et al. 2019). Although opposed to 
Western influence, China tacitly accepts the EaP as Russia’s sphere of influence and 
avoids any entanglement in security-related or geopolitical issues (Kaczmarski et al. 
2019). 
One potential source of threat to the stability and governance capacity of the 
countries in the EaP, however, may stem from China’s economic engagement and its 
BRI flagship project. Although, as a default strategy, China prefers peaceful 
economic cooperation with other countries, empirical evidence has recently 
emerged that economic dependency on or indebtedness to China could lead to 
governance breakdown or violent conflicts in affected countries. For instance, 
China’s economic engagement in Myanmar has exacerbated the long-standing 
internal conflict in Myanmar’s Kachin region (Hedström 2019). China’s planned 
construction of the Myitsone Dam in Kachin sparked local protests and contributed 
to increasing tensions and proliferating military activity along the China-Myanmar 
border (Hedström 2019). Hurley et al. (2019: 2) observed that, in a few affected 
countries, high indebtedness to China and Beijing’s increasing role in managing 
bilateral debt problems has exacerbated internal tensions, such as citizen clashes 
with police over new projects in Sri Lanka or China’s encouragement of Pakistan’s 
opposition to embrace Chinese projects. The authors screened the likelihood of debt 
problems in 68 countries taking part in China’s BRI initiative and identified 23 
countries that may be at risk of BRI-related debt distress (Figure 3). Alongside a few 
Western Balkan countries, three EaP countries appear in the list and need to be 
closely observed: Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine (Hurley et al. 2019). 
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Figure 3: Countries at risk of BRI pipeline project-related debt effects 
 
Source: Hurley et al. (2019: 16) 
2.4 Tipping points 
Overall, we can identify a few tipping points related to geopolitical rivalry and risks 
of major armed conflict that may trigger governance breakdown and/or violent 
conflict in the EaP. With regard to the role of the US, transactional US policymaking 
and spontaneous attempts to disengage from the region may act as actual tipping 
points as they often disregard the complex nature of conflicts as well as order 
contestation in the EU’s neighbouring regions, and could act as a trigger for new 
violent conflicts or add to governance problems in countries with severe ALS 
problems, such as Ukraine. The recent outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and 
Kurdish militias in Northern Syria following the US withdrawal is illustrative of this 
tipping point, and a similar scenario could repeat in the EaP. Both tipping points 
related to the role of the US unfold as gradual processes which could culminate in 
negative geopolitical shifts for the stability of the region. 
Regarding the risk of geopolitical rivalry, Russia is the actor most likely to trigger 
new violent conflicts or governance breakdowns in the EaP. Overall, we can identify 
four tipping points that may lead to governance breakdown and violent conflicts in 
the EaP as a result Russia’s increased military assertiveness. First, Western 
engagement in the perceived area of Russia’s privileged interests may result in the 
Kremlin attempting to punish any neighbouring state that receives Western 
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attention. Second, high oil prices may increase the likelihood of Russia’s aggressive 
behaviour as high energy incomes insulate the Russian government from both 
domestic and Western pressure. Third, the emergence of domestic political 
challenges may force the Kremlin to try to divert public attention towards foreign 
policy issues. Intensification of hostilities with neighbouring countries or new 
military campaigns may serve as fruitful diversionary tactics. Fourth, Russia may be 
more tempted to engage in military adventurism, both in the EaP and in the MENA, 
if it expects its economic and political costs to be low (low-cost opportunities). All 
tipping points related to Russia have occurred in the past, and some, such as 
negative reactions to Western engagement, are actually occurring now, meaning 
that these are highly probable impacts. In terms of timespan, all four tipping points 
related to Russia could emerge quite suddenly and contribute to quick 
destabilization in the region. Hence, while not necessarily one-time catastrophic 
events, they are likely to unfold much more rapidly than tipping points related to 
the US and China.  
Finally, it is hard to imagine China’s active engagement with ALS or CO in the EaP 
countries for years to come. Although, like Russia, China is against revolutionary 
changes and supports autocratic incumbents by default, Beijing’s reaction to the 
recent Euromaidan protests was disengagement, not support for destabilization or 
violence. China remained similarly silent when Russia’s annexation of the Crimea 
jeopardized Beijing’s plans to acquire a deep-sea port in Sevastopol (Kaczmarski et 
al. 2019). Therefore, unlike Russia, China does not a have a history of coercive 
involvements in the EaP area, nor does it show any significant intent to do so, thus 
we can only hypothesize about Beijing’s potential negative influence in the future. 
Considering the previous record of Beijing’s engagement with other regions of the 
world, at least two tipping points can be posited which could push China to defend 
its interests at the cost of violent conflict or governance breakdown. First, if local 
developments fundamentally threaten Beijing’s BRI flagship project and its trade 
and investment plans (Moran 2017), China may react more resolutely in the future. 
Second, China may instrumentalize high indebtedness to China to force 
governments in affected countries to comply with Beijing’s terms by mobilizing 
public protest or opposition forces against the government (Hurley et al. 2019). Or 
public protests could erupt spontaneously against Chinese projects due to their 
environmental, social, or political impacts. Either way, the unrest could result in 
violent clashes or governance breakdowns. All tipping points related to China are 
hypothetical since they have never occurred in the past and their potential to occur 
in the future is uncertain and would depend on geopolitical shifts in the region. In 
terms of the timespan, both tipping points can unfold as gradual processes but may 
also accelerate significantly if China perceives that its interests are at risk. 
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3. UNCONVENTIONAL SECURITY RISKS 
3.1 Grey-Zone/Hybrid Warfare 
In their conceptual paper on global and diffuse risks, Magen et al. (2019a: 29) define 
grey-zone and hybrid warfare as “a holistic approach to conflict that is 
distinguishable from better-known uses of military force.” According to the authors, 
“the holistic characteristics [of hybrid warfare] combine kinetic and non-kinetic 
activities against military and civil targets, and psychological operation campaigns 
aim at the civilian population and political echelon using a wide variety of 
mediums.”3  
The Russian 2014 intervention in Ukraine has generated much debate about the use 
and effectiveness of hybrid warfare. Russia turned “hybrid warfare” into a real threat 
to overall stability and presented significant challenges to European security and the 
global international order. Moscow’s swift achievement of political objectives in 
Crimea without the need to fire a single shot has forced NATO and its allies to 
reconsider their approach to defence planning. The practice of so-called hybrid 
warfare ‒ the use of proxies, disinformation, and other measures short of war ‒ has 
dominated discussion of Russia’s newly assertive posture on the world stage 
(Chivvis 2017).  
Although some scholars have criticized the term “hybrid warfare” as a buzzword 
lacking a clear definition (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen 2016), these tactics can 
be classified as a distinct form of warfare that describes the Kremlin’s use of a broad 
range of subversive instruments, many of which are non-military, to further Russian 
national interests. While experts frequently discuss the Ukrainian case as a vivid 
example of Russian hybrid warfare tactics, intensive use of this new form of 
projecting power actually dates back to the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 
2008, when the Kremlin was able to experiment with elements of hybrid warfare and 
learned basic lessons later applied in Ukraine. One novel tactic Russia has employed 
since the Russo-Georgian conflict and is still using effectively against Tbilisi is the 
“borderization”4 of Georgia’s territory (Kakachia 2018). By deepening the 
estrangement of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia, borderization 
violates not only Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty but also undermines 
the wider regional security order. Russia has used hybrid warfare tactics not only in 
the EaP but also in the Middle East and the United States as well.  
                                               
3
  The academic literature provides a variety of definitions hybrid warfare. For consistency, we stick to 
the definition provided by Magen et al. (2019). For other definitions, see Galeotti (2019).  
4
  Borderization “refers to the unilateral installation of border markers, fencing, and barbed wire 
along the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) that separate Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region 
(“South Ossetia”) from the rest of Georgia” (Kakachia et al. 2017: 5). 
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These events have reinforced the perception that Russian foreign policy is entering a 
new chapter of bold and risky adventurism, guided by the so-called “Gerasimov 
doctrine”.5 While the Gerasimov doctrine may not in fact be the main driver of 
Russian Foreign policy (Rumer 2019), Moscow does seek to use hybrid warfare to 
ensure compliance on a number of specific policy objectives: “to divide and weaken 
NATO and EU; to subvert pro-Western governments in EaP countries; to create 
pretexts for military incursion; to annex territory; and to ensure access to European 
markets on its own terms” (Ng and Rumer 2019). In fact, most of Russia’s hybrid 
tactics have been highlighted in fundamental documents, including its National 
Security Strategy to 2020 (EZTH Digital Library 2009) and its Foreign Policy Concept 
(President of Russia 2019).  
As the use of hybrid warfare by Moscow has grown markedly in recent years, it poses 
serious risks to its immediate neighbours. Russia’s Hybrid strategies towards some 
EaP countries (specifically Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) involve multi-layered 
efforts designed to destabilize functioning states and polarize societies. According to 
the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation for 2008 and 2013 
(President of Russia 2008; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 2013), the world 
should be governed by large geographic centres characterized by cultural 
(civilizational) diversity. It also emphasises competition over values and the 
negative impact of a “re-ideologization” of international affairs. While Russia sees 
post-Soviet space as one civilizational space ready for further integration under 
Russia-led political groupings, it also uses hybrid warfare tactics to target specific 
EaP populations to gain information superiority over the target country. In a 
coordinated attack, the Russian state propaganda machine targets a country’s media, 
religious organizations, cultural institutions, NGOs, academia, and public 
movements (Helmus et al. 2018). 
The present situation in the EaP unavoidably produces certain levels of risk. While 
the region remains in a democratic transition period, the presence of ALS in the 
form of unresolved conflicts is a source of insecurity, and a number of factors – 
drivers of escalation – may increase the dangers of conflict or trigger total 
governance breakdowns. Factors contributing to escalation in the short term could 
include political and military miscalculations due to lack of communication among 
conflict parties, as evidenced during the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. As Georgia’s 
then-president recalled after the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, neither the Georgian 
                                               
5
  The “Gerasimov doctrine” refers to a putative strategy of non-linear warfare that combines 
various instruments including technological, cultural, diplomatic, and other tactics. The focus is 
on non-military means and instrumentalizing the weaknesses of the enemy. The term is in fact 
very controversial, and some authors argue that it does not exist in the form that it is understood 
to by the West (e.g., Galeotti 2018). 
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leadership nor the Western partners predicted that the ongoing low-intensity 
conflict would turn into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Georgia (Tavberidze 2019). 
This also applies to other conflict areas in the EaP. As channels of communication 
between conflict parties are limited and international mediators are absent on the 
ground, the conflicting sides often act without prior knowledge about adversaries’ 
intentions. Domestic processes in the conflict areas could also serve as a predictor 
for renewal of violence. The de facto incumbent regimes in the Russia-backed 
conflict regions may use military actions to try to divert public attention from 
troublesome elections, governance deficiencies, or socio-political hardship. For 
instance, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war was preceded by continuous shelling of 
Georgian villages in the conflict area by the paramilitary militias of South Ossetia’s 
de facto regime. Similarly, a new war could break out in Russia-supported conflict 
areas even without any prior involvement or intention by Russia. Hence, the agency 
of local actors in ALS should be taken seriously. The situation in the post-Soviet 
conflict areas is further exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of international 
mediation efforts and suboptimal conflict prevention mechanisms (Kuzio 2020; 
Waal 2019). Furthermore, persistent neglect of fundamental principles of 
international humanitarian law may spark social and political discontent and unrest 
in the region. While a full-scale war is not expected in the short term in the EaP 
region, further escalation of existing conflicts would change the entire politico-
military dynamic in the region dramatically and escalate it to a level not 
experienced since the worst periods of the Cold War. 
Other global and regional actors keep a low profile in the EaP area when it comes to 
grey zone/hybrid warfare. Iran, another regional player, is notorious for its hybrid 
and non-linear warfare, and, according to some analysts, its actions are comparable 
to Russia in this regard (Gardner 2015). However, it seems that Iran’s activities are 
chiefly directed towards the MENA and only to a lesser extent towards the EaP area. 
Since Iran seems to acknowledge the EaP area as a zone of Russia’s privileged 
interests, it generally limits its activities there to economic and trade relations, 
cultural diplomacy, and utilization of soft power (Jödicke and Kakachia 2017). One 
notable exception is Iran-Azerbaijani relations, which have been long shaped by 
mutual threat perceptions and religious and political tensions (Valiyev 2017). 
Similarly, with the exception of strained relations with Armenia (Giragosian 2009), 
Turkey is apparently not involved in hybrid warfare in any of the EaP states. Finally, 
China, a major non-liberal global actor, has so far avoided engagement in hybrid 
warfare in the EaP area, even though Chinese economic and political influence has 
been on the rise in the region (Kaczmarski et al. 2019).  
3.2 Cyber-Warfare 
Cyber risks belong to the category of diffuse risks as cyberspace is of a diffuse and 
transnational nature. Cyberattacks may be organized by various state and non-state 
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actors and target governmental agencies, the banking sector, big industrial 
companies, think-tanks, and/or NGOs. Cyberwarfare and other risks related to the 
cyber-domain are prominent in the EaP, where the main cyber warfare actor is 
Russia. Russia has used cyber warfare as a part of its larger external governance 
strategy in its neighbourhood, which involves waging “full-spectrum conflict” 
(Jonsson and Seely 2015) against neighbouring countries. Cyberattacks have been 
directed against the EaP countries which Russia considers pro-Western or unwilling 
to accept Russia’s claims to influence in the post-Soviet area. During the 2008 
Russia-Georgia War, for instance, cyberspace represented another layer of the 
conflict (Markoff 2008).  
Ukraine in particular has “become a scorched-earth testing ground for Russian 
cyberwar tactics” (McQuade 2018). Allegedly, Russia-backed cyberattacks targeted 
Ukrainian electricity grids in 2015, causing a six-hour blackout for hundreds of 
thousands of consumers in Kyiv (E-ISAC 2016; Sullivan and Kamensky 2017). In 2017, 
allegedly Russian hacker groups launched NotPetya, “the fastest-propagating piece 
of malware”, which was directed against Ukraine but caused global damage of $10 
billion (McQuade 2018). Russia’s cyber warfare against Ukraine may also pose a 
specific danger to the EU. According to one observation, the percentage of pirated 
software which does not receive standard security patches is high in Ukraine. The 
country is at the same time “well integrated with Western European internet 
networks” offering “a backdoor to hack the rest of Europe” (Cerulus 2019).  
Unlike Russia, other global state and non-state actors seem to keep low profile when 
it comes to cyber warfare in the EaP area. Iran has been blamed a few times for 
cyberattacks on Azerbaijani websites (Yevgrashina 2012). Teheran and Baku seem to 
have strained relations due to mutual misunderstandings related to history and 
identity, as well as Baku’s close political and military links with the US and Israel 
(Nassibli 1999; Yevgrashina 2012). Similarly, Turkey-sponsored hackers have been 
accused of conducting occasional cyberattacks against Armenia (Martirosyan 2018). 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, two countries in conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh, have also 
engaged in cyberattacks against each other (Abrahamyan 2012). In most cases, 
cyberattacks in the EaP area are conducted by non-state actors (hacker groups), 
though these are closely connected to and financed by their governments, and hence 
should not be considered as independent groups but more as state proxies. 
As with other risks, the degree of vulnerability to cyber warfare and cybercrime 
should be measured by taking into account both the exposure of societies and 
economies to cyber risks and their preparedness to tackle them (internal resilience). 
In the EaP area, Ukraine is most exposed to cyber threats, but the country is also 
rapidly developing the cyberwarfare capabilities to increase its resilience to future 
attacks. There are a few rankings that measure the cyber preparedness and cyber 
exposure of countries (ITU 2018; NCSI 2019). However, due to differences in 
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methodology and data collection techniques, their results differ significantly. 
Overall, the majority of EaP states score highly in such indexes and show a higher 
degree of preparedness and risk resilience when compared to many MENA countries 
(e.g., Figure 4). 
Figure 4: International Telecommunication Union's Global Cybersecurity 
Index (GCI) 
 
Key: The five pillars of the index are: capacity building, cooperation, 
organizational measures, technical measures, and legal measures. In the 
heat map, countries that demonstrate high commitment in all five pillars 
are indicated in light blue. Blue indicates countries that have developed 
complex commitments and engage in cybersecurity programmes and 
initiatives. Dark blue countries have only started to initiate commitments in 
cybersecurity. Source: ITU (2018: 13). 
3.3 Technology-Driven Disruption 
Another layer of unconventional warfare is related to negative impacts of the 
development of artificial intelligence (AI) and technology-driven disruption in the 
EaP. Magen et al. (2019a: 60) expect Russia to instrumentalize AI “to manipulate and 
influence Ukraine, Georgia, and other areas under strong Russian influence, 
triggering governance breakdown or even outright conflict on Europe’s doorsteps in 
the coming years.” One important pillar of Russia’s AI-driven warfare includes 
spreading fake news and propaganda in neighbouring countries to strengthen pro-
Russian narratives and delegitimize pro-Western governments and political classes. 
Ukraine and Georgia show some home-grown resilience to Russia’s AI-driven 
warfare. Stop-fake6 in Ukraine and Mythdetector7 in Georgia are two counter-
propaganda initiatives to challenge Russia’s fake narratives and reveal lies spread by 
Russian media. Yet empirical evidence shows that Russian fake news travels well 
                                               
6
  https://www.stopfake.org/en/main/ 
7
  https://www.mythdetector.ge/en 
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throughout the post-Soviet area, and more resilience measures are needed to 
mitigate its negative impact. Public surveys in the EaP countries show how anti-
Western narratives promoted by Russia undermine liberal values and tarnish the 
image of the EU and the West (Lebanidze 2018). In doing so, they also undermine the 
reform and governance capacity of pro-Western governments and open the door to 
populism and the radicalization of societies.  
As well as intensifying disinformation warfare, AI technologies can also contribute 
to violent conflicts by making it easier and more cost-effective for assertive state 
actors such as Russia to engage in conflicts. Russia is trying to incorporate AI in new 
weapons systems and robotics. The long list of Russia’s AI-driven military projects 
includes the development of autonomous smart missiles that the next-generation of 
Russian stealth fighters will be equipped with (Newsweek 2017), AI-driven “swarms 
of drones” (Newsweek 2017), and autonomous Kalashnikov machine guns with a 
neural self-targeting system (BBC 2017). Due to its authoritarian system and lack of 
deliberation or checks and balances, the Russian government has a capacity to take 
important decisions about engaging in conflicts and to mobilize resources quickly 
and in a non-transparent way. The development of AI-guided technologies will give 
Russia even better capacity to engage in conflicts in the EaP or start new ones much 
faster and more effectively. For instance, in 2011, when Russia attempted to buy 
Mistrals (French helicopter carriers), the Russian navy allegedly claimed that with 
those vessels Russia would have defeated Georgia in a 2008 war “in 40 minutes, not 
in 26 hours” (Kucera 2011). Military AI developments could have a similar effect, 
allowing Russia to act more quickly and resolutely to catch the West by surprise. 
What is more, perhaps with the exception of Ukraine, none of the EaP states will be 
able to catch up with Russia due to limited human and financial resources, 
increasing the probability of a new violent conflict.  
In addition to Russia, China also wields significant influence over the EU’s 
neighbourhood in terms of AI. Although Russia’s AI-driven warfare is currently 
more visible in Ukraine, Syria, and other places, China has a much larger overall 
financial and operational capacity to become a global leader in AI technologies. 
China is already a major supplier of AI surveillance technologies worldwide and 
dominates AI markets both in the EU and its neighbourhoods (Figure 5). A recent 
report by Carnegie shows that leading Chinese company Huawei is present in 50 out 
of 75 countries that employ AI surveillance technologies, outnumbering all 
international rivals by a wide margin (Figure 6). What is more, China’s global AI 
strategy is not a standalone initiative but is tightly embedded in Beijing’s global 
economic and political strategy. For instance, there is a significant overlap between 
China’s BRI and export markets for AI technologies. According to Carnegie, “thirty-
six out of eighty-six BRI countries also contain significant AI surveillance 
technology” and China’s AI products “are often accompanied by soft loans to 
encourage governments to purchase their equipment” (Feldstein 2019: 2, 8).  
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Figure 5: Origins of AI surveillance technology 
 
Key: blue: US, red: China, blue and red: US and China, black: other countries. 
The Index presents a country-by-country snapshot of AI tech surveillance 
with the majority of sources falling between 2017 and 2019. Source: Feldstein 
(2019: 3). 
Figure 6: Leading companies contributing to AI surveillance 
 
The Index tracks seventy-five countries that employ AI surveillance. The 
numbers reflect how many of those countries each company is present in. 
Source: Feldstein (2019: 9). 
The proliferation of Chinese AI technologies not only challenges Western 
manufacturers in the commercial arena but also indirectly undermines the Western 
liberal order and helps authoritarian governments consolidate their grip on power 
and suppress dissent. China is often referred to as a global leader in exports of 
“authoritarian tech” (Feldstein 2019: 13), “digital authoritarianism” (Polyakova and 
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Meserole 2019), or “the Surveillance State” (Mozur et al. 2019). There is rich empirical 
evidence that Huawei and other Chinese companies help authoritarian governments 
in Africa and Latin America to spy on and suppress political opponents (Mozur et al. 
2019; Parkinson et al. 2019). Chinese engagement with the EaP countries could have a 
similar effect. China has been intensively exporting “smart city” and “safe city” 
technologies to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states (Marat 
2018). These technologies are designed to improve urban life, but they can also be 
used to “expand authoritarian control over people and public places” and therefore 
may “rival and even replace the Western-driven, values-based rule of law programs” 
(Marat 2018: 1). In doing so, China follows commercial but also political and security 
interests. It is countering EU and US influence and attempting to become the main 
provider of cyber and AI technologies in the region. 
3.4 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control  
In their conceptual paper on global risks, Magen et al. (2019a: 31) note that the norms 
governing arms control and the non-proliferation regime (NPR) are eroding and 
there is “a risk of increased … WMD … and of a renewed arms race between 
superpowers.” The credibility of the NPR has also suffered in the EaP. A major blow 
to its credibility was the violation of the Budapest Memorandum on Security 
Assurances for Ukraine, signed at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) conference by Russia, the US, and the UK in 1994. In exchange for 
joining the NPT (which meant Ukraine relinquishing control of its nuclear stockpile 
to Russia), the signatories guaranteed “respect for Ukraine’s borders, independence, 
and sovereignty, and promise[d] to refrain from the threat or use of economic and 
military force” (Talbott and Tennis 2019). Later on, however, Russia annexed the 
Crimea and supported separatist movements in the Eastern part of Ukraine. The US 
and UK supported Ukraine politically and imposed sanctions on Russia, but this did 
not result in restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity or in significant 
improvement of the country’s overall security.8  
WMD-related risks are also closely related to cyber warfare and cyber criminality 
due to the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to cyberattacks. For instance, Russia, one 
of the main sponsors of cyber warfare, itself faces a high rate of cyberattacks which 
raise the chances of accidental nuclear attack or a nuclear catastrophe in the EaP. 
According to Ramana and Kurando (2019: 48), “[b]ecause the Russian nuclear arsenal 
is highly integrated and kept ready for quick launch, it is more vulnerable to 
potential accidental use of nuclear weapons. They also note that the risks of nuclear 
accident through cyberattacks will increase as Russia further modernizes and 
                                               
8
  Some authors emphasize that the Budapest Memorandum only provided security guarantees to 
Ukraine in case of nuclear attack. See Haines (2014). 
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digitalizes its nuclear systems, including the installation of a new generation of 
command and control systems. A nuclear accident caused by a cyberattack would 
have negative consequences on a global scale, but its consequences would be most 
devastating for the EaP. 
3.5 Tipping Points 
When it comes to hybrid warfare in the EaP countries, three tipping points can be 
identified that can push existing ALS and CO into violent conflicts. First, 
miscommunication and misjudgement of the intensions of adversaries – referred to 
as “bounded rationality” in the academic literature – can contribute to a quick 
escalation of conflict and a lack of risk-aversive behaviour. A second tipping point 
could be domestic developments in ALS themselves. Although local de facto regimes 
are highly dependent on Russia, they do possess enough agency to autonomously 
organize provocations or escalate the tensions with central governments in the EaP 
states in case of domestic political need. Such actions also help incumbent de facto 
regimes to divert public attention from dire socio-economic conditions in these 
territories. Third, changes in the status quos in ALS that threaten the political 
interests of local political elites could prompt renewed violence. Incumbent de facto 
regimes may resort to provocations and escalation of tensions if the current 
stalemates begin to change to their disadvantage. Hence, a sudden change of the 
present status quo could act as another tipping point for escalation. In case Russia 
reaches an agreement on conflict settlement with Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine, the 
local de facto regimes or other local influential radical groups may attempt to renew 
the violent conflict to preserve the current status quo. All tipping points related to 
hybrid warfare can take a form of both one-time events and gradual processes, and 
have a medium to high probability of occurrence.  
With regard to cyber warfare, two potential tipping points can be identified: First, 
cyberattacks targeted against critical infrastructure can also further weaken the 
governance capacity of countries already suffering from severe ALS and CO. In case 
of a major concerted cyberattack against the critical infrastructure in a country with 
weak governance capacity, a national or partial governance breakdown is always a 
possibility. Second, the high degree of penetration of pirated software in the 
computer systems of the EaP countries could make cyberattacks against 
infrastructure or cyber criminality and espionage both easier and more devastating. 
Both tipping points can occur either as sudden events or evolve as gradual processes. 
However, a cyberattack against critical infrastructure is more likely to occur as a 
sudden event, whereas penetration of pirated software into computer systems is 
generally a gradual process. 
With regard to technology-driven disruption, there are three probable tipping 
points: First, AI-driven algorithms can change the nature of disinformation and fake 
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news by further sophistication of their promotion strategies, meaning external 
actors could destabilize EaP countries and limit governance capacity of the local 
governments more easily. Second, the AI-driven revolution in military technology 
will likely make warfare more autonomous and escalate both the global arms race 
and the likelihood of proxy conflicts. Also, importantly, through AI-driven 
modernization, more low-cost opportunities for military adventurism may emerge 
for external actors, as faster and more covert warfare will make it harder for a slow 
animal like the EU to react quickly to hostile actions. 
With regard to the WMD, the good news is that there is no nuclear arms race in the 
EaP despite the weakening of the NPR. However, nuclear risks are also closely linked 
to cybersecurity and cyberwarfare. Therefore, one potential tipping point may be a 
cyberattack on a nuclear facility in Russia, the EaP states, or the EU. The digital 
modernization of nuclear systems in Russia may invite cybercriminal groups to 
launch a major cyberattack against Russia’s nuclear facilities to cause a nuclear 
catastrophe. Similar attacks can also be launched against EU member states. In terms 
of timespan, a cyberattack on a nuclear facility would most likely be a one-time 
event with catastrophic consequences. 
4. ENVIRONMENTAL AND BIOLOGICAL RISKS  
Environmental risks have potential to significantly exacerbate ALS and CO in the 
EaP and have proximate implications for the EU’s security and internal stability. 
Climate change and other environmental risks can act as significant triggers of 
violent conflicts and governance breakdown in the EU’s neighbourhood, adding “an 
additional layer of stress that can increase state fragility and the likelihood of 
conflict” (McLeman 2017: 105). Reviewing this broad literature, Magen et al. (2019a: 
39) have identified several factors that may lead to circumstances under which 
climate change and other environmental risks may weaken state capacity and 
legitimacy and create opportunities for violent conflicts or governance breakdown, 
including economic factors, competition over river water, regime type, chronic 
internal conflict, prior exposure to disaster, population growth, population 
movement, rapid-onset geological disasters, and political fragility. Yet, while 
environmental risks have already had considerably detrimental impacts on the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood,9 in the EaP their impact has been rather negligible thus 
far. In the wider post-Soviet area, only Central Asia and Ukraine are significantly 
affected by physical water scarcity and a potential for water conflicts (Figure 7).  
                                               
9
  The MENA, for instance, is the most water-scarce region in the world, with two-thirds of the 
population living in “areas that lack sufficient renewable water resources to sustain current levels 
of activity and growth” (Baconi 2018: 1), and where the main factors contributing to conflicts are 
water scarcity which impacts governance capacity and water resource competition. 
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Figure 7: Global water scarcity by 2025 
 
Source: Diehn (2018). 
Nevertheless, political use of water resources and water management may add an 
additional layer of conflict risk even in the areas which do not suffer from water 
scarcity but are marked by the presence of unresolved conflicts. For instance, the 
Georgian hydropower facility of Enguri is located in both Abkhazia and Samegrelo 
region and serves both regions as well as whole country. Existing agreements ensure 
a win-win use of the facility, compelling Georgia’s central government to keep 
providing electricity to Abkhazia for free in exchange for continued Abkhazian and 
Russian acknowledgement of Tbilisi as the owner and operator of the facility 
(Sabonis-Helf 2017). However, an increase in Abkhaz consumption combined with 
inability of the local regime to collect taxes, Georgia’s continued development of its 
own energy infrastructure, and the rising costs of operating the Enguri plant may 
make the existing status quo unsustainable, creating additional triggers for the 
intensification of the conflict (Sabonis-Helf 2017).  
There is also a “water dimension” to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, where water 
infrastructure suffered collateral damage as a result of the “indiscriminate shelling 
of vital civilian infrastructure”, according to UNICEF (CNN 2019). In 2019, the 
fighting in eastern Ukraine resulted in disruption or complete stoppage of the water 
supply for 3.2 million people, increasing the risks for the outbreak of communicable 
diseases (CNN 2019). Finally, water resources have been a subject of political 
instrumentalization between water-poor Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2015, the PACE 
rapporteur asserted that the management of the Sarsang Reservoir situated within 
the Nagorno Karabagh region “were ‘deliberately depriving’ adjoining Azerbaijani-
controlled regions of water” (Shikhali and Safarova 2016) and were using “the water 
resources as a political tool” (PACE 2015).  
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4.1 Natural Disasters and Other Climate-related Risks  
Overall, as is the case with water scarcity, the EaP seems to be less exposed to climate 
risks than the southern neighbourhood (Figure 8).10 According to USAID (2018: 17), in 
terms of “climate exposure” the majority of countries in the EaP experience either 
“some fragility” (Belarus), “moderate fragility” (Azerbaijan and Russia), or “low 
fragility” (Armenia and Georgia), but Ukraine is considered “highly fragile”.  
Figure 8: Global Adaptation Index Score 2015 
 
The Global Adaptation Index Score rates a county's vulnerability to climate 
change in combination with its readiness to improve resilience (the higher, 
the better). Source: Resourcewatch (2019a). 
Nevertheless, environmental and climate change-related risks may be becoming 
more significant in the EaP. Ukraine, as one of the world’s largest grain exporters, is 
particularly affected by weather variability, droughts, aridity, changing levels of 
precipitation and other environmental and climate change-related phenomenon 
(Müller et al. 2016). These climate-related challenges will require more investments 
in adaptation measures, such as efficient irrigation technologies and more or 
climate-resistant agricultural infrastructure (Aliieva 2017). This would, however, put 
additional pressure on the already fragile economic and financial system of the 
country. Also highly affected by climate risks are the South Caucasus countries, 
whose economic and social systems depend heavily on tourism and agriculture. In 
Armenia, weather-related hazards resulted in the loss of $2.8 billion between 1998 
and 2010, and the continued decrease in water levels due to recurring droughts, 
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  In the MENA, for instance, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq have more than 10% of their population in high 
exposure areas and are considered by USAID as “highly fragile states with large population in 
high climate exposure areas” (USAID 2018: 12). 
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floods, and frosts threatens rural livelihoods and food security (USAID 2017). Such 
changes have the potential to generate social tensions and violent cleavages in a 
country that has a long tradition of socio-political protests and uprisings (Lebanidze 
2019a).  
4.2 Disease Outbreaks 
Disease outbreaks are diffuse risks with uncertain probability and their occurrences 
are hard to predict. Yet, when they occur, they can easily undermine the governance 
capacity of weak states or even trigger violent conflicts. States with limited 
governance capacity will be most affected as they will find it hard to limit the spread 
and cope with the socio-economic consequences of the disease. As with other global 
and diffuse risks, resilience can act as a countervailing factor and prevent risks 
related to health disasters from materializing as threats (Magen et al. 2019a).  
The recent outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic tested the resilience of the EaP 
states to the global risk of disease proliferation. In the first two weeks of the 
outbreak, the majority of the EaP states managed to contain the virus and avoid 
exponential growth somewhat effectively by adopting harsh containment measures 
such as closing borders with affected countries, medical checks in airports and at 
border crossings, and profiling and quarantining suspected cases. In doing so, they 
managed to extend the first phase of the outbreak and to flatten the curve at least for 
a few weeks. Subsequently, however, the number of infections increased 
exponentially in the majority of EaP states and, to date, has crossed the threshold of 
1,000 infected per million citizens in three countries (Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine) 
(Worldometer 2020). Still, the long-term management and implications of the 
outbreak are yet to be seen. The EaP states are particularly exposed to three tipping 
points related to the SARS-CoV-2 risk: first, should the spread of the virus increase 
further as a result of inability of governments to contain it, it may lead to the 
breakdown of the healthcare systems, resulting in a both a rapidly increasing death 
toll and a legitimacy crisis for state institutions. Second, an extended period of 
lockdown may damage the already weak economies of the EaP states. Unlike EU 
countries, the EaP states do not command the economic and financial resources to 
sustain economic standstill for a prolonged period. Third, should the EU itself and 
other regions surrounding the EaP area experience a second wave of the pandemic it 
could also result in severe governance crisis in the EaP states as it may be 
accompanied by severe global food crisis and breakdown of important supply chains 
for basic goods including cereals and other food products.  
4.3 Tipping points 
The literature on environmental risks identifies a number of potential tipping 
points which, should they overlap with climate-related risks, may lead to violent 
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conflicts or governance breakdowns, including migration, urbanization, population 
growth, mismanagement of natural resources, political fragility and presence of 
chronic internal conflicts (Baconi 2018; USAID 2018; Magen et al. 2019a). Moreover, 
the environmental risks themselves can act as multipliers of other risks and prepare 
ground for governance breakdown or conflict. In the EaP, however, although 
populations are affected by water scarcity, air pollution, environmental degradation 
and other climate-related risks to various degrees, these risks are not the leading 
causes behind existing ALS and CO. In the foreseeable future, the ongoing processes 
of climate change, man-made disasters such as air pollution, or construction of high-
impact projects such as hydro-electric power plants, increase potential for tipping 
points in some EaP states, yet it is unlikely that they will lead to new conflicts or that 
their impact will be as significant as other global and diffuse risks, such as 
geopolitical rivalry or hybrid/cyber warfare. Finally, in terms of recent SARS-CoV-2 
outbreak, we can identify three tipping points that may overshadow the initial 
moderate successes of some of the EaP states in terms of containing the virus and 
result in governance problems or perhaps even violent conflicts: a massive spread of 
the virus, an extended period of lockdown, and a second wave of pandemics at global 
level. Massive spread of the virus may cause a breakdown in healthcare systems and 
prevent governments from providing populations with this major public good. 
Extended lockdowns may hit EaP economies hard, resulting in even more 
unemployment, poverty, diminished economic opportunities for the self-employed 
population, and ultimately in a legitimacy crisis for state administrations. A second 
wave of pandemic at global level may derail supply chains and result in a global food 
crisis severely affecting a majority of the EaP states. In terms of timespan, 
environmental and biological risks can take a form of both one-time events and 
gradual processes. In terms of likelihood, the majority of environmental risks have 
only potential impact on the EaP area, whereas the impacts of disease outbreaks may 
be actual due to the ongoing SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.  
5. DEMOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION  
The issue of migration (including irregular migration) into EU territory and 
demographic challenges have received unprecedented attention in Europe in recent 
years. Irregular migration has risen to become listed as a top priority challenge for 
many member states. The migration issue, which per se does not represent a risk for 
the EU, has been partly successfully securitized by populist and right-wing parties in 
a process that has led to a backlash against mainstream liberal parties, an 
unravelling of established party systems, and a reshaping of traditional political 
cleavages in many EU member states (Inglehart and Norris 2016). To overcome “the 
populist zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004), the EU and its member states have been trying to 
regulate migration more strictly and decrease the number of irregular migrants. 
However, proper and rule-based management of migrant and refugee flows by the 
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EU depends on the stability and governance capacity of neighbourhood countries. 
Therefore, in terms of irregular migration, the EU’s resilience crucially depends on 
the resilience and cooperation capacity of its neighbours to the East and in the 
South. However, when comparing the EU’s two neighbourhoods with each other, 
there are few structural factors that make the EaP more internally resilient and less 
challenging for the EU in terms of irregular migration. 
First, migration dynamics in the long term are closely related to demographics. In 
this regard, the two neighbourhood regions differ greatly from each other. 
According to the 2013 EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, the MENA is 
characterized by rapid growth of population and has a high proportion of young 
adults whereas the EaP, like the EU itself, is experiencing “population ageing and a 
shrinking number of citizens” (Fargues 2013: 5). Indeed, already in 2013, two years 
before the peak of the Syrian refugee crisis, 71 percent of the 9.3 million migrants to 
the EU from the southern neighbourhood and Turkey, and only 19 percent came 
from the EaP countries. Moreover, despite the recent conflict in the Eastern Ukraine 
and increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), migration flows from 
the East increased only slowly and never matched the dimensions of that from the 
MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in 2014 Ukrainians submitted only 
14,000 applications for refugee status in the EU compared to 138,000 applications 
from Syrians or 109,000 applications from citizens of Western Balkan states 
(Jaroszewicz 2015: 1). Since 2017, the EU has had visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements with the majority of the EaP states, hence migration flows are more 
regulated and irregular migration is limited by a better enforcement of 
international law and bilateral agreements. In addition to irregular migration, 
terrorism and rising extremism are also high on the agenda in the EU and are 
likewise often instrumentalized by Eurosceptic actors. Whereas migrants from some 
EaP states show a higher average involvement in organized crime, they are rarely 
involved in terrorist activities or networks (Lebanidze and Panchulidze 2018). 
Therefore, overall, compared to the MENA, the EaP presents less challenge for the EU 
in terms of irregular migration and by extension the rise of right-wing and 
Eurosceptic forces.  
On the other hand, there are at least three challenges related to migration and 
demography risks that have potential to undermine the governance capacity of the 
EaP states and also pose a risk to the EU. First, the majority of the EaP states are 
affected by population decline (Table 1) which may turn to be unsustainable and 
undermine their governance capacity. One of the major sources behind 
demographic decline is labour migration and brain drain to other countries, 
including the member states of the EU. For instance, according to some estimates, 
about two million Ukrainians live and work only in Poland, making Ukraine the 
biggest receiver of remittances in all Europe (Walker 2019). At the same time, 
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“educated young people” are “disproportionately likely to emigrate” undermining 
labour-market competitiveness and contributing to long-term structural 
demographic imbalances in the EaP (RFE/RL 2016). 
Table 1: Population decline in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood 
Country Population Decline 
(1999‒2019) (percent) 
Population (2019) 
Armenia -15.7 2,965,269 
Azerbaijan +28.5 9,981,457 
Belarus -7 9,475,174 
Georgia -31 3,723,464 
Moldova -18.6 3,550,85211 
Russia -0.6 143,666,93112 
Ukraine -18.9% 41,983,564 
Source: Data for population for all countries: Eurostat (2020). Data for 
population decline for all countries: RFE/RL Georgia (2020) 
Second, due to numerous unresolved conflicts, some EaP countries have had to deal 
with the economic and social burden of a large number of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) (Table 2). Georgia suffered severe IDP crises throughout the 1990s 
which contributed to the failure of the Georgian state at the beginning of the decade 
(Gvalia et al. 2019). The 2008 Russia-Georgia war resulted in 138,000 short-term and 
30,000 long-term displacements within Georgia (UNCHR 2009). Moldova 
experienced a similar crisis when, as a result of the Transnistrian conflict, 51,000 
persons became internally displaced. The domestic turmoil in Moldova was, 
however, not as severe as in Georgia, and the majority of IDPs were able to return 
home immediately following a rapid ceasefire agreement (NRC/Global IDP Project 
2004). Currently, Ukraine is suffering the largest IDP crisis, with different sources 
estimating the country harbours between 800,000 and 1.5 million IDPs (IDMC 2019a; 
Nieczypor 2019). A large number of long-term IDPs have significantly impaired 
governance capacity in all EaP states. With several million IDPs and refugees living 
resentfully in different parts of the EaP region or other foreign lands, they exert a 
strong political and moral influence on local politics and the decision-making 
process. Moreover, IDPs became the object of social and physical discrimination in 
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 For Moldova, the last available data is from 2017. 
12
 For Russia, the last available data is from 2014. 
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Georgia in the 1990s, but have suffered similar stigma in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. 
Yet, these IDP flows did not result in new violent conflicts, and, in a majority of EaP 
states, they managed to integrate rather easily with host communities, not least due 
to cultural and religious homogeneity. Hence, whereas a further deterioration of 
governance quality is to be expected as a result of the new IDP flows in Ukraine and 
other EaP states, these are unlikely to result in social tensions or violent conflict. To 
conclude, even though irregular migration presents less of a risk in relation to the 
EaP area than from the MENA countries, the EU would still need to step up its 
financial and institutional support to the EaP states. The EU could also help the 
fragile economies of these states to alleviate the negative effects emanating from 
the problems of IDPs and the challenges of irregular migration.  
Table 2: Numbers of refugees and IDPs in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood 
Country Refugees IDPs (conflicts) IDPs (disasters) 
Armenia 17,970 8,400 - 
Azerbaijan 1,131 344,000 390 
Belarus 2,234 No data No data 
Georgia 1,991 293,000 310 
Moldova 418 - 200 
Russia 77,397 2,300 3,600 
Ukraine 2,620 800,000 130 
Source: Number of refugees for all countries: World Bank (2019). Number of 
IDPs for all countries: IDMC (2019a). 
Finally, in some EaP countries, migration trends from non-Western countries have 
contributed to the emergence of xenophobic sentiments and strengthening of social-
conservative and Eurosceptic forces (Gordon 2020). For instance, in Georgia, the 
main drivers of populist nationalist forces have been anti-Muslim and anti-Chinese 
sentiments, especially in response to the acquisition of arable lands by citizens of 
non-Western countries (Lebanidze 2019b). If not checked, these trends may 
contribute to political polarization and radicalization in EaP countries, leading to 
societal and political cleavages, legitimacy crises, and governance problems.  
5.1 Tipping points  
Although irregular migration, including refugee flows, is a major short-term 
challenge for the EU, its origins lie mainly in the MENA and the SAA regions and 
only to a lesser extent in the EaP. On the other hand, irregular migration and 
demographic decline pose a potential risk for the EaP states themselves and under 
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certain conditions could increase the chances of governance breakdown and/or 
violent conflict. As with other risk categories, demography and irregular migration 
overlap and interact with other challenges. The first tipping point is related to low 
fertility rates, population decline, and increasing labour migration of high-skilled 
labour to Russia and the EU countries which are contributing to brain drain and 
undermining the economic competitiveness and governance capacity of EaP states.  
The second tipping point is related to large numbers of IDPs in the majority of the 
EaP states, and new displacement crises may overstrain the governance capacities of 
EaP countries. The third tipping point is related to irregular migration to the EaP 
countries: the migration flows to EaP countries from the MENA, India, or China may 
strengthen populist nationalism and contribute to polarization and radicalization, 
creating new societal cleavages. In terms of timespan, tipping points related to 
demography and irregular migration generally take the form of gradual processes 
(e.g., developments such as brain drain or a surge in populist nationalism due to 
increased migration). Some migration-related tipping points could also occur as one-
time events, however, if for instance a new flow of IDPs began as a result of military 
conflict in the EaP area. 
6. GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND OTHER SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC RISKS 
6.1 Euro-Area Fiscal Challenges and Sovereign Debt 
The main global economic risks that could impact ALS and CO in the EaP include 
major Eurozone fiscal challenges, trade tensions leading to a global economic 
slowdown or recession, and corporate debt (Magen et al. 2019a). EaP countries are 
highly integrated with global financial and trade systems, and a crisis in the EU or in 
any major economic or financial powerhouse of the world will have negative 
repercussions for the region. The 2008 World Financial Crisis and the subsequent 
European debt crisis triggered economic recession (Table 3), diminishing industrial 
output, depreciation of currencies, and capital outflow. While this did not result in 
regime breakdown, it did significantly impair the already struggling economies of 
the EaP countries. Nevertheless, most EaP countries have since become even more 
integrated into the EU’s economic and financial systems through a new generation 
of trade agreements and increasing trade patterns. Hence, any event that 
destabilizes the EU’s economy in the future – including a hard Brexit – will also have 
negative spill-over effects in the EaP. 
In addition, the EaP could be negatively impacted by other global economic events, 
such as the looming crisis in Argentina (Roubini 2019), or the economic fallout of the 
SARS-COV-2 pandemic. The vulnerability of the EaP is also exacerbated by its 
economic dependency on regional economic powerhouses such as Russia, China, 
and Turkey. The majority of EaP states depend on Russia, to various degrees, for 
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their export markets, remittances, and investments. Economic recession, currency 
fluctuations, or a shrinking labour market in Russia will have inevitable negative 
effects for all EaP states. Russia could also try to deliberately destabilize EaP states 
by instrumentalizing asymmetric economic dependency, as it has already done in 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine through energy cuts or swift energy price 
hikes during winter, economic and financial embargoes, cutting off remittances, 
and/or deportation of the county’s migrant labour force (Cenusa et al. 2014; Livny et 
al. 2009). Russia’s previous economic and energy destabilization strategies have 
significantly impaired the governance capacity of the EaP states and even 
threatened the EU’s energy security.  
Table 3: GDP growth of selected countries and regions, 2005–2010 (in 
percent) 
Region/Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
United States  2.9 2.8 2 1.1 – 2.9 0.9 
Japan  1.9 2 2.4 – 0.7 – 5.3 0.1 
Asia 8.3 9.1 9.7 6.9 3.3 5.6 
EU  2 3.1 2.9 0.9 – 4.0 – 0.1 
EU candidate countries  8 6.7 4.8 1.3 – 3.6 2.1 
CIS13 6.7 8.4 8.5 5.6 – 3.8 1.4 
MENA  6.8 6.4 7 5.9 1.5 1.6 
Latin America  4.6 5.4 5.6 4.2 – 1.6 1.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.6 6.5 6.6 5.2 2.5 3.5 
World  4.5 5.1 5.1 3.1 – 1.4 1.9 
Source: Smith and Swain (2010: 5).  
6.2 US-China Trade Tensions 
The ongoing trade war between the US and China may negatively affect economic 
developments in the EaP region in a number of ways. First, protectionism by both 
the US and China would lead to more risk-averse behaviour and the withdrawal of 
capital from risky assets (Sophia 2018). The EaP countries have emerging markets 
with moderate or low-risk ratings that may be subject to capital outflow or may 
experience reduction of foreign direct investment, negatively affecting both equity 
markets and local stocks (Sophia 2018). 
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Second, trade tensions between the US, China, and the EU could have a negative 
impact on the oil industries of oil-producing countries such as Azerbaijan or Russia. 
Middle Eastern oil exports account for 40 percent of China’s oil imports (Sophia 
2018). On a global level, a trade war may also result in “slower global economic 
growth or even global recession” leading in turn to lower oil prices “since the price of 
oil is often directly related to global economic prospects” (Pollock 2019).  
Finally, countries in the EaP may be pressured to take sides in the trade tensions 
between the US and China, especially in areas of security-related trade and 
investment, such as weapons, cyber technology, or sensitive raw materials (Pollock 
2019). Ukraine has already experienced this sort of pressure from the US 
administration. This could leave EaP countries without much-needed investments 
and may lead to capital outflows and investment scarcity. 
6.3 Tipping points 
Overall, we can identify at least four tipping points that may turn economic risks 
into threats in the EaP, amplifying the effects of external economic shocks in ALS 
and CO into violent conflict or governance breakdown: domestic socio-political 
mismanagement, Russia’s economic decline and its impacts on EaP countries, the 
instrumentalization of economic dependency by external/regional actors, and a 
decrease in global demand for oil.  
The first tipping point is a bundle of socio-political factors: poverty, unemployment, 
and social inequality coupled with corruption and state capture. The majority of the 
EaP countries suffer from extreme poverty, unemployment, and high inequality, 
and therefore domestic socio-economic factors on their own can act as triggers for 
violence, radicalization, and political instability. In addition, in most EaP countries, 
state capture takes the form of oligarchic governance ‒ as in Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine (Cenusa et al. 2017; Lebanidze and Kakachia 2017) ‒ or even more autocratic 
“limited access orders” (LAO) ‒ as in Azerbaijan and Belarus (Guliyev 2005; Wilson 
2011). Autocratic or oligarchic social orders can be stable as long as they provide the 
population with basic goods and services and guarantee social rights. In case of 
economic deterioration as a result of global economic downturn, they can easily 
break up the LAO-based social contracts and contribute to popular uprisings, 
violence, or governance breakdown.14 Not only the velvet revolutions in Armenia, 
Georgia, and Ukraine, but also numerous other protests and demonstrations that 
have taken place in the EaP over the past twenty years, were at root social uprisings 
against actual socio-economic hardship and political mismanagement, making such 
a tipping point highly probable. The second and third tipping points are related to 
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Russia but can also be precipitated by other regional actors as well. On the one hand, 
the economies of most EaP states are tightly bound to the big regional markets (of 
Russia, EU and Turkey), so a potential economic crisis in these countries would 
result in economic underperformance in the EaP area. On the other hand, Russia 
itself may continue to instrumentalize the economic dependency of its 
neighbouring countries to extract political concessions, resulting in trade and 
energy wars. Finally, sudden changes in the global market may also trigger 
economic distress in the EaP. Any potential decrease in global demand for oil, for 
example, may throw to oil-rich countries such as Azerbaijan into severe economic 
and financial crisis.  
In terms of timespan, tipping points related to global financial and economic risks 
can be both sudden one-time events and gradual processes. Whereas domestic socio-
political mismanagement and Russia’s economic decline would be long-term 
processes unfolding in several interrelated sequences, the instrumentalization of 
economic dependency by external actors can also be sudden events or a rapid chain 
of them. One example of the latter would be Russia’s coercive economic policies 
towards Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the impacts of global and diffuse risks on the EaP states of 
the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. It systematically applied five major risk clusters to 
the EaP and identified 28 actual, probable, and potential impacts that could act as 
tipping points escalating regional ALS and CO into violent conflicts or governance 
breakdowns (Table 4). Below, we compare the destabilizing potentials of each risk 
cluster in the EaP, discuss their implications for the EU’s stability and security, and 
suggest which risks the EU and its member states should prioritize. 
7.1 Prioritization of Global and Diffuse Risks 
While the EaP states are exposed to the majority of the global and diffuse risks, some 
risks could have more detrimental impact on EaP states and by extension on the EU’s 
stability and security than others. In terms of severity of impact on the EaP states, 
geopolitical rivalry, unconventional security risks, and global economic risks, as 
well as disease outbreaks seem to have the biggest destabilizing potential in the 
short term (i.e., the next five years). With the exception of disease outbreaks, which 
are hard to predict, these are also the risks that are most likely to occur (highly 
probable impacts) or in some cases are already occurring (actual impacts). First, 
geopolitical rivalry, intensified by Russian assertiveness and US transactionalism, 
leaves the EaP more vulnerable to new or resurgent conflicts in already existing ALS 
and/or “frozen” conflicts. Second, unconventional security risks, such as cyber or 
hybrid warfare, add yet more potential for sudden and unpredictable escalation in 
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the EaP countries, and are also highly probable, judging by the destructive 
cyberattacks witnessed over last decade. Moreover, if such attacks potentially target 
or infiltrate nuclear infrastructure, this could critically increase their severity of 
impact both for the EaP and the EU. Finally, as the EaP states are tightly integrated in 
regional and global economic and trade networks, any global or regional economic 
risk would, with high probability, have a severe detrimental impact and contribute to 
societal radicalization and polarization or even the emergence or renewal of conflict. 
While disease outbreaks such as the recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic are harder to 
predict, their negative impacts will probably be even more severe. Such events may 
quickly unfold into massive governance crises, undermining governance capacity, 
decreasing the legitimacy of state institutions, and even resulting in governance 
breakdown and violent conflict. EaP states appeared to be somewhat resilient in the 
first few weeks, but the spread of virus later increased considerably in almost all of 
the EaP states except Georgia. The healthcare systems of some of the EaP states are 
already overstretched and not fully able to deal with the results of the pandemic. It is 
also likely that the economic costs of harsh measures will further impact their 
economic and political stability in the immediate and long term without sufficient 
assistance by major international actors including the EU. 
Other risks, such as environmental degradation, air pollution, or droughts can also 
produce severe impacts in the medium-to-long term, but act neither as major sources 
nor as major multipliers of negative impacts on current ALS or CO in the EaP. Nor 
are they likely to produce a new violent conflict or governance breakdown in the 
immediate future, barring unexpected natural disasters (such as earthquakes), the 
probability of which is difficult to determine. Similarly, demographic risks such as 
an aging and declining population coupled with high rates of immigration are long-
term challenges for most EaP countries but, again, are not likely to produce 
instabilities or major governance problems in the short term.  
To conclude, overall, in the short term, three global risks have the most probable and 
potentially severe impacts on ALS and CO in the EaP: geopolitical rivalries, 
unconventional security risks, and global economic and financial risks. They meet 
all three criteria of prioritization: they may occur in the immediate short term, their 
impact may be severe, and their probability of occurrence is relatively high. Disease 
outbreaks such as SARS-CoV-2 have uncertain probability but equally severe impacts 
in the short term. Environmental and demographic risks could also have severe 
impacts, but most likely in the medium and long term.  
7.2 Risks, Resilience and Governance Capacity 
To determine the overall impact of global and diffuse risks, we also need to consider 
the most important countervailing factor: the extent to which societal resilience is 
able to neutralize their negative impacts. Building resilience forms a significant part 
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of the EU’s new foreign policy strategy (EEAS 2016). The EU defines societal 
resilience as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and 
recovering from internal and external crises” (EEAS 2016: 23). While exploring the 
components of such resilience was not the primary aim of this paper, we can 
nonetheless draw some general conclusions from the insights of various indexes 
and rankings. Firstly, despite some serious governance problems in the EaP, there 
are no failed states or areas with total governance failure, and most EaP socieites do 
possess some basic level of internal resilience in terms of functional political 
institutions. True, low levels of social trust and perceived legitimacy of political 
institutions have often resulted in legitimacy crises and sometimes even in 
temporary governance failure or violent conflict (such as the 2013 Euromaidan 
protests in Ukraine). Nevertheless, unlike in the MENA, conflicts that have domestic 
causes tend to deescalate after some time, and there are no permanent ungovernable 
spaces or civil-war like conditions. The moderate level of domestic societal resilience 
in most EaP states is also a good starting point when facing some of the global and 
diffuse risks (such as climate change, hybrid warfare, or cyberattacks) with targeted 
assistance from external actors.  
The situation is a little different, however, with the first risk cluster: geopolitical 
rivalry and risk of major armed conflict. Here, the impact of Russian adventurism, 
especially in terms of the frozen and semi-frozen conflicts, is severe and 
omnipresent. On its own, Russia greatly outperforms all EaP states in terms of 
material resources and mobilization capacity. Therefore, it is not clear what level of 
domestic societal resilience in the EaP states would be necessary to offset the current 
escalation of geopolitical risks related to Russia. Similarly, it is questionable whether 
strengthening the domestic resilience of the EaP states would really help to decrease 
risks emanating from the existing ALS (unresolved conflicts) where Russia holds the 
dominant military position. 
7.3 Tipping Points 
If global and diffuse risks reach a certain tipping point, they may result in 
governance breakdown or violent conflicts. Throughout the paper we identified a 
few tipping points for each risk cluster specific to the EaP context, noting that their 
likelihood, time span, and impact may vary. Some of these may be one-time, 
suddenly occurring events; a cyberattack on critical infrastructure or a nuclear 
facility, for instance, or acute congestion of the healthcare system or extended 
lockdown due to a disease outbreak, either of which may then trigger governance 
breakdown or a new conflict. Other tipping points, such as brain drain, irregular 
migration, or high indebtedness may be long-term processes yet still act as triggers 
for governance breakdown or violent conflict. Moreover, since most global risks and 
their subcomponents act in tandem, we should also consider the synergic or 
snowballing effects of their tipping points, and a few such combinations should be 
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carefully observed in the EaP. For instance, brain drain, socio-political 
mismanagement (poverty and inequality), and influx of migrants from other 
countries may trigger new waves of societal radicalization or even violent conflicts 
in times of economic crisis. Similarly, tipping points from the clusters of geopolitical 
rivalry and unconventional security risks may very often overlap and produce 
dangerous synergies. From an empirical viewpoint, this underlines the need to move 
beyond isolated analyses of individual risk factors and their tipping points towards 
exploring synergic effects of groups of risks in the EU’s neighbourhood.  
7.4 Implications for the EU’s Security and Stability 
We can also draw some conclusions regarding the proximate impacts of the global 
and diffuse risks in the EaP countries for the EU’s stability and security. Each of the 
five risk clusters analysed here has some potential to trigger governance problems 
or violent conflicts in the EaP, but can also undermine the EU’s security or stability 
in other ways. For instance, geopolitical rivalries and the increasing influence of 
Russia and China in the EU’s neighbourhood limits the EU’s power and governance 
capacity in various ways, undermines its power of attraction, and challenges the 
liberal script at the EU’s borders and beyond. Moreover, the withdrawal of the US 
from the EU’s neighbourhood regions and the transactional policies of the current 
US administration have created a power vacuum and left the EU in an 
uncomfortable situation. The coincidence of regional geopolitical rivalries and 
nonconventional types of warfare have contributed to the emergence and 
persistence of unresolved conflicts and intensified CO in most EaP states, 
undermining the EU’s external governance capacity and threatening its internal 
security in various ways. The EU is forced to invest more in the troubling 
neighbourhood countries to sustain a minimal degree of governability and reform 
capacity. Conflicts in the EaP have also resulted in new flows of refugees and 
irregular migrants into the EU, although to a much lesser degree than from the 
MENA and SAA. Unconventional security risks exacerbate further the geopolitical 
rivalry and governance problems in the EaP, but can also have more severe impacts 
if, for instance, cyber sabotage is conducted against nuclear facility in Russia or any 
other state. Disease outbreaks such as SARS-CoV-2 can further expose the 
weaknesses of governance systems, intensifying or expanding existing ALS. While 
environmental risks pose a serious danger to the EaP in the medium-to-long term, in 
the short term, their impact is only moderately acute. Therefore, in the immediate 
future, the proximate impact of environmental risks from the EaP may be 
considered highly probable but only moderately significant for the EU’s overall 
security and internal stability. All such actual, probable, and potential impacts of 
global and diffuse risks  demand the EU step up its support for the EaP countries in 
order to prevent governance breakdowns and political instabilities which could 
generate negative spill-over effects for the EU. 
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Table 4: Global and diffuse risks and tipping points in the EU’s neighbourhoods 
Risk Clusters Tipping points 
 Actual impacts Probable impacts Potential impacts 
Geopolitical 
rivalry and the 
risk of major 
armed conflict 
[USA] Perceived 
withdrawal of the US 
from the EaP area;  
[USA] Transactionalism 
of the US 
administration;  
[Russia] Western 
activity in Russia’s 
perceived sphere of 
influence.  
[Russia] Threat to 
regime’s domestic 




dynamics (high oil 
prices);  
[Russia] Emergence of 
low-cost opportunities. 
[China] Threat to the 
BRI and other flagship 
initiatives; 
[China] High 
indebtedness to China. 
Unconventional 
security risks 
[AI] Contestation of 
established orders by 
propaganda and fake 
news campaigns; 
[AI] More low-cost 
opportunities for Russia 
due to faster warfare; 
[AI] More societal 
tensions due to 
expanded means of 
control for authoritarian 
regimes. 
[Hybrid warfare] 
Diversionary tactics of 
local de facto regime in 
ALS; 
[Hybrid warfare] 
Miscalculations due to 
lack of communication; 
[Hybrid warfare] 
Changes to the status-
quos in ALS; 
[Cyber warfare] 
Destruction of critical 
infrastructure by a 
cyberattack.  
[Cyber warfare] Pirated 
software; 
[WMD] Cyberattack on 
nuclear facility (in 





Exponential spread and 
congestion of the 
healthcare system; 
[Disease outbreaks] 








Second wave of SARS-
COV2 and food supply 
shortages;  
[Competition over river 
water] 
Instrumentalization of 






Rising populism due to 
migration in EaP 
societies; 
[Irregular migration & 
demography] Brain 
drain and population 
aging.  
[Irregular migration] A 












inequality, coupled with 
state capture and 
corruption). 
[Trade tensions] A 
decrease in global 






[Global economic crisis] 
Economic decline in 
Russia, the EU and/or 
Turkey and its spill-over 
effects on EaP area. 
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